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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ROY, UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MELVIN MURPHY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920088CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION BY JURY OF GUILTY DATED 
JANUARY 14, 1992, ROY CIRCUIT COURT, 
HONORABLE JUDGE DUTSON PRESIDING 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Court empowered by 78-21-3 Court of Appeals Jurisdiction; 
specifically, 78-2a-3(d) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
In this case there is only one issue. It can be approached in 
different manners. Specifically however, at the trial of Defendant 
a weak case was bolstered by allowing medical testimony of Eric 
Froerer. Mr. Froerer is a fire fighter and paramedic employed by 
Roy City, Plaintiff. 
In his capacity Mr. Froerer took confidential information from 
Defendant Melvin Murphy regarding his physical condition while Mr. 
Murphy was in a custodial circumstance and badly injured in a motor 
vehicle accident. At no time was Defendant told that this 
information which was elicited from him would be used in a criminal 
trial. It was admitted against strenuous objection, which 
objection is page 4, 5 and 6 of the testimony of Eric Froerer 
1 
(Record of testimony of Eric Froerer filed in this Court). The 
testimony was allowed by Judge Dutson. A jury convicted Mr. Murphy 
of DUI on Janaury 14, 1992. 
This certain prejudicial evidence was introduced, which 
evidence should have been excluded on three grounds, as well as its 
prejudicial effect. Only because this evidence was introduced was 
there sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Murphy since a 
substantially plausible alternate story* was presented to the jury 
and because of the improperly prejudicial statements of Eric 
Froerer, Appellant submits he was convicted. 
Since the decision to admit the medical technician's testimony 
was a question of law on the issue of witnesses, it would appear 
that the Standard of Review for both issues relating to 
admissibility of the evidence would be where the appeal presents 
only questions of law, the Court will review trial Court's rulings 
for correctness and accord them no particular deference Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 
1982); See also Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving Co. v. 
Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 78-24-8 Privileged Communications and 
Utah Code Annotated 26-25-1 Confidential Information Release et. 
seg. Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence in Utah. 
*Mr. Murphy was a painter coming hone from work and the smell of paint and paint thinner were around him in the 
car, 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At issue at a crucially balanced trial was the question which 
was presented to the Judge and appears before this Court in the 
record entitled "Testimony of Eric Froerer" filed with this Court. 
Summarizing Mr. Froerer's testimony, he was a medical technician 
and paramedic fire fighter (R:8 et. sea, for job description) and 
hired by Roy City (R:8) and interviewed Melvin Murphy with respect 
to his level of consciousness after an accident occurred and 
assessed him on several scales and stated (R.16) "[t]hat there was 
a strong odor of alcohol that was coming from Mr. Murphy's breath" 
according to Mr. Froerer. 
On page 18 of the Record, on direct examination Mr. Davis 
cunningly elicits from Paramedic Froerer, who was investigating Mr. 
Murphy in his official capacity, "that you asked him questions 
about his drinking" and Paramedic Froerer indicated that "he had 
just left a bar and that he'd had a few drinks". And although 
Paramedic Froerer is not offered as "an expert" (R.14-19), still 
Paramedic Froerer is permitted to testify against Mr. Murphy in a 
semi expert position to indicate that he believed the problems were 
alcohol, though he did not indicate alcohol at the time of the 
arrest (See Record at page 24:8-11) and acknowledged that the car 
which had the accident, a car driven by Defendant, was full of 
vapor and fumes from the paint supplies which Defendant used in his 
profession. 
All the technical matters relating to the deficit which 
Defendant showed are without foundation of medical skills 
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s u f f i c i e n t to make such an opinion, but may have been admissible i f 
Defendant wished to show that the abrasion to h i s head in the 
accident had d i sor iented him, but are not f a i r l y submitted before 
a jury with no foundation, and over strenuous objec t ions on 
Miranda,** type grounds where a State agent i s quest ioning an 
individual under arrest by an assoc ia ted s t a t e agency, by the fact 
that these medical records should been kept conf ident ia l as i s 
required in the afore quoted Confidential Information Release 
Sect ion of the Utah Code which holds that l i a b i l i t y at taches unless 
excluded, and that heal th information i s not to be re leased , and 
that a Defendant has the right to request that health information 
obtained on him should not be used against him without h i s 
permission. 
Absent Paramedic Froerer's damning s e m i - o f f i c i a l indictments , 
i t i s surely c lear to see that Melvin Murphy may not have been 
convicted by a jury in t h i s matter. The stamp of off ic ia ldom of 
Paramedic Froerer and h i s "non expert opinions" had on the jury 
against Defendant's presumption of innocence, surely creates a 
prejudice against Defendant and denies him a fa i r t r i a l . 
The Court in Miranda concluded "unless adequate pro tec t ive 
devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings, no statement obtained from defendant can truly be the 
product of free choice . There was no i n t e l l i g e n t waiver by Mr. 
Murphy, the circumstances were such that he was in the control of 
**the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v, Arizona concluded that even without resort to b ru t a l i t y , , . custodial 
interrogat ion exacts a heavy tool on individual l ibe r ty and trades on the weakness of individuals . Also, that even 
if i t might not find that the Defendant's statements were involuntary in t rad i t iona l terms, if the defendant :s 
not apprised of his r ights in this s i t ua t i on , we can be never sure the statements were a product of free choice. 
384 U.S. 435 36 S.Ct. 1602 16 L.Ed.2d 594 1966. 
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Mr. Froerer and clearly in this case on Miranda grounds the 
testimony of Paramedic Froerer should not have been permitted. 
Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence in Utah declare that although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . . Clearly in 
this case, this testimony was ultimately prejudicial to Appellant. 
As stated above, Defendant had the right by three (3) separate 
methods of demanding that the objectionable testimony of Paramedic 
Froerer be kept out of consideration of the jury. Despite these 
objections Paramedic Froererfs testimony was admitted and his "non 
expert" opinion relating to Defendant was put before the jury. 
Specifically, (1) Defendant had the right to protect his 
medical records, (2) to invoke the medical privilege, and (3) the 
right to exclude his civil statements to a state agent while in 
custody. Regarding custodial interrogation, See Record at page 13 
where Paramedic Froerer says he was taking responsibility for 
Defendant; specifically, line 21, "my main concern was getting him 
out of the cold and into the ambulance, where I can do a full 
assessment, 'cause, you know, the conditions of that car, it was 
smashed into a truck, he's in a bad position, he's in a compact 
position, . . . . 
And continuing on page 15 of the Record, where Roy City 
Paramedic Froerer says "as soon as I found out he was conscious and 
breathing, I went with my equipment into the ambulance, ready to 
set up, came back, helped them with a back board and the 
5 
extrication equipment to get him into the ambulance. So we could 
further assess him". (R.15:2-6). 
Defendant asserts his medical privilege on page 16 of the 
Record. 
Apellant maintains this is an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant also believes this error constitutes grounds for 
reversal because there is a reasonable likelihood that a more 
favorable result would have been obtained by Mr. Murphy in the 
absence of this error. See Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 
P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). 
The error was not a harmless one and requires reversal and a 
new trial with the paramedic's testimony excluded. 
ARGUMENT 
This case raises a question of whether or not a city employee 
can give medical statements given while a citizen is in custody in 
a criminal proceeding, against the wishes of Defendant who is being 
tried in a criminal matter relating thereto. It seems clear to 
Defendant that the power of a public official speaking at a public 
trial on his opinion cannot be overestimated. This is why 
Defendant strenuously objected to Roy City Paramedic Froerer's 
testimony and why the Roy City Prosecutor thought it was essential . 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant requests a new trial in this matter with the 
testimony of Roy City Paramedic Froerer excluded on the grounds 
6 
herein above urged. 
^ ^ DATED this °^ ^ day of November, 1992 
ROBERT MACRI 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed four copies of the foregoing to: 
CRIS DAVIS, Esq. 
Roy City Prosecutor 
5051 South 1900 West 
Roy, Utah 84067 
on/ferhas •y^— day of November, 1992 . 
^{(^r / 
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78-21-3. Court to decide quest ions of law. ".|J 
All questions of law, including the admissibility J 
evidence, the facts preliminary to such admission, (k| 
construction of statutes and other writings, and tin 
application of the rules of evidence are to be decidd 
by the court and all discussions of law addressed toil 
Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law mA 
evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knoJ 
edge to the jury, who are bound to accept it. v mk 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice,' confusion, or 
waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence. 
78-24-8. Privi leged communications. 
There are particular relations in which it is the 
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to pre-
serve it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be ex-
amined as a witness in the following cases: 
(1) (a) Neither a wife nor a husband may ei-
ther during the marriage or afterwards be, 
without the consent of the other, examined 
as to any communication made by one to the 
other during the marriage. 
(b) This exception does not apply: 
(i) to a civil action or proceeding by 
one spouse against the other; 
(ii) to a criminal action or proceeding 
for a crime committed by one spouse 
against the other; 
(iii) to the crime of deserting or ne-
glecting to support a spouse or child; 
(iv) to any civil or criminal proceed-
ing for abuse or neglect committed 
against the child of either spouse; or 
(v) if otherwise specifically provided 
by law. 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of 
his client, be examined as to any communication 
made by the client to him or his advice given 
regarding the communication in the course of his 
professional employment. An attorney's secre-
tary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be examined, 
without the consent of his employer, concerning 
any fact, the knowledge of which has been ac-
quired in his capacity as an employee. 
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the 
consent of the person making the confession, be 
examined as to any confession made to him in his 
professional character in the course of discipline 
enjoined by the church to which he belongs. 
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the 
consent of his patient, be examined in a civil ac-
tion as to any information acquired in attending 
the patient which was necessary to enable him to 
prescribe or act for the patient. However, this 
privilege shall be deemed to be waived by the 
patient in an action in which the patient places 
his medical condition at issue as an eleau_, 
factor of his claim or defense. Under thoeej 
cumstances, a physician or surgeon who half 
scribed for or treated that patient for the met 
condition at issue may provide information 
terviews, reports, records, statements, m~ 
randa, or other data relating to the patL 
medical condition and treatment whid$ 
placed at issue. 
(5) A public officer cannot be examined! 
communications made to him in official ca-
dence when the public interests would suffer! 
the disclosure. ••WJ 
(6) A sexual assault counselor as definedl 
Section 78-3c-3 cannot, without the consentj 
the victim, be examined in a civil or criii 
proceeding as to any confidential communia 
as defined in Section 78-3c-3 made by the vid 
Any health care provider who intentionally or 
knowingly violates any provision of Section 26-23a-2 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. i»88 
CHAPTER 24 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT ACT 
(Renumbered by Laws 1990, ch. 186, §§ 889 to 
913.) 
26-24-1 to 26-24-24. Renumbered as §§ 17A-3-
501 to 17A-3-525. 
CHAPTER 25 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RELEASE 
Section 
26-25-1. Authority to provide data on treatment 
and condition of persons to designated 
agencies — Immunity from liability. 
26-25-2. Restrictions on use of data. 
26-25-3. Information considered privileged com-
munications. 
26-25-4. Information held in confidence — Pro-
tection of identities. 
26-25-5. Violation of chapter a misdemeanor — 
Civil liability. 
26-25-6. Confidentiality requirements regarding 
communicable or reportable diseases. 
26-25-1. Authority to provide data on treatment 
and condition of persons to designated 
agencies — Immunity from liability. 
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organiza-
tion may, without incurring liability, provide the fol-
lowing information to the persons and entities de-
scribed in Subsection (2): 
(a) information, including information re-
quired for the medical and health section of birth 
certificates, as determined by the state registrar 
of vital records appointed under Chapter 2; 
(b) interviews; 
(c) reports; 
(d) statements; 
(e) memoranda; and 
(f) other data relating to the condition and 
treatment of any person. 
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) 
may be provided to: 
(a) the department; 
(b) the Division of Mental Health within the 
Department of Human Services; 
(c) scientific and health care research organi-
zations affiliated with institutions of higher edu-
cation; 
(d) the Utah State Medical Association or any 
of its allied medical societies; 
(e) peer review committees; 
(0 professional review organizations; 
(g) professional societies and associations; and 
(h) any health facility's in-house stall commit-
tee for the uses described in Subsection (3). 
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) 
may be provided for the following purposes: 
(a) study, with the purpose of reducing mor-
bidity or mortality; or 
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospi-
tal and health care rendered by hospitals, health 
facilities, or health care providers. 
(4) Any person may, without incurring liability, 
provide information, interviews, reports, statements, 
memoranda, or other information relating to the ethi-
cal conduct of any health care provider to peer review 
committees, professional societies and associations, or 
any in-hospital staff committee to be used for pur-
poses of intraprofessional society or association disci-
pline. 
(5) No liability may arise against any person or 
organization as a result of: 
(a) providing information or material autho-
rized in this section; 
(b) releasing or publishing findings and con-
clusions of groups referred to in this section to 
advance health research and health education; or 
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these 
studies in accordance with this chapter. 
(6) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "health care provider" has the meaning set 
forth in Subsection 78-14-3(9); and 
(b) "health care facility" has the meaning set 
forth in Section 26-21-2. 1990 
26-25-2. Restrictions on use of data. 
The department, the Division of Mental Health 
within the Department of Human Services, scientific 
and health care research organizations affiliated with 
institutions of higher education, the Utah State Med-
ical Association or any of its allied medical societies, 
peer review committees, professional review organi-
zations, professional societies and associations, or any 
health facility's in-house staff committee may only 
use or publish the material received or gathered un-
der Section 26-25-1 for the purpose of advancing med-
ical research or medical education in the interest of 
reducing morbidity or mortality, except that a sum-
mary of studies conducted in accordance with Section 
26-25-1 may be released by those groups for general 
publication. 1990 
26-25-3. Information considered privileged 
communications. 
All information, including information required for 
the medical and health section of birth certificates as 
determined by the state registrar of vital records ap-
pointed under Chapter 2, interviews, reports, state-
ments, memoranda, or other data furnished by reason 
of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions re-
sulting from those studies are privileged communica-
tions and may not be used or received in evidence in 
any legal proceeding of any kind or character. 1989 
26-25-4. Information held in confidence — Pro-
tection of identities. 
All information, including information required for 
the medical and health section of birth certificates as 
determined by the state registrar of vital records ap-
pointed under Chapter 2, interviews, reports, state-
ments, memoranda, or other data so provided shall be 
held in strict confidence by the person or organization 
to which it is provided, and any use, release, or publi-
cation resulting therefrom shall be made so as to pre-
clude identification of any person or persons studied. 
1989 
26-125-5. Violation of chapter a misdemeanor — 
Civil liability. 
(1) Any use, release or publication, negligent or 
otherwise, contrary to the provisions of this chapter 
shall be a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not relieve the person or 
organization responsible for such use, release, or pub-
lication from civil liability. 1991 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
the defendant is entitled to a not guilty verdict. % 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. By reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on 
reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. 
It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is merely 
fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
/ t-r\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, 
you can take into consideration their bias, if any is shown, 
their interest, if any, in the result of the lawsuit either as 
parties or otherwise, or any probable motive or lack thereof to 
testify as they do, if any is shown. You may consider whether 
any witness contradicted himself or herself, the witnesses' 
deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness or lack 
thereof of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor 
or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to 
understand, their capacity to remember and any other fact or 
circumstance which you believe may have a bearing on the 
truthfulness or accuracy of the statements of witnesses. You may 
consider any or all of these factors and determine therefrom, in 
accordance with your honest convictions, what weight and 
credibility you should give to the testimony of each witness, 
measured by reason and common sense and the rules set forth in 
these instructions. 
The testimony of a witness known to have made false 
statements on one matter may thus be less convincing on other 
matters. So if you believe a witness has willfully testified 
falsely as to any material fact in this case, you may disregard 
the whole of the testimony of such witness, or you may give it / < ^ ^\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page Two 
such weight as you think it is entitled to. Discrepancies in a 
witnesses1 testimony or between the testimony of different 
witnesses, if any, do not in themselves necessitate the 
discrediting of testimony. Innocent failure of recollection or 
misrecollection might occur. Furthermore, two witnesses to the 
same event might perceive the event differently. 
£^1 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, ROY DEPARTMENT 
:Y OF ROY 
Plaintiff 
iVIN MURPHY 
Defendant 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
CASE NO: 912001982 TC 
! ROLE OF THE JURY 
A. INSTRUCTING THE JURY about the law which applies to this case is one 
my duties as judge. At various times during the trial I will read to you 
tain instructions which explain your duties as jurors and the principles of 
which will guide your decision, A written copy of these instructions will 
given to you to use in the jury room. You have a duty to follow these 
tructions. 
B. THE INSTRUCTIONS should be CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE. Just because 
e instructions are given first, or last, doesn't mean they deserve any more 
ention than any other instruction. Do not single out any part and ignore 
rest. Consider them as equally important. 
C. QUESTIONS OF FACT are for the jury to decide. The main question 
will decide is whether the defendant is guilty of the charges in the 
ormation. In making this decision, do not be influenced by your emotions, 
ther you like or dislike the defendant should not affect your verdict. The 
t that the defendant may have been arrested or summoned, or charged in any 
ormation, or brought to trial should not be considered by you as any 
dence of guilt. The defendant is presumed to be innocent. 
D. RECESSES will be called from time to time during the trial. During 
recess do not talk about this case among yourselves, or with anyone else. 
not form or express an opinion until the case is submitted to you for 
ision. Keep an open mind until you have heard both sides. 
CEMENTS BY JUDGE AND ATTORNEYS 
A. OPENING STATEMENTS may be made by counsel on both sides to give you 
review of what they expect their witnesses to say. Counsel will also make 
sing arguments at the end of the trial. These statements and arguments by 
isel are not evidence. Their purpose is to help you understand and analyze 
evidence. 
B. A STIPULATION is an agreement by both attorneys that certain things 
true. You should regard any stipulated facts as having been conclusively 
ved. 
C. OBJECTIONS may be made to particular questions which will be asked 
ing the trial, if the objecting attorney believes that answer would not be 
issible evidence. There are rules to determine what evidence is competent 
the jury to consider. These rules are enforced by the court after an 
ection is made. If an objection is overruled, that means the evidence can 
le in, and it may be considered by you. If an objection is sustained, the 
dence is kept out. Do not speculate about the reasons for objections, or 
r
 the court rules one way or the other. 
D. THE PERSONAL OPINIONS of myself as judge, or of the attorneys in 
LS case are immaterial. We are officers of the court. It would not be fair 
: any of us to express or to imply any personal opinion as to guilt or 
locence, or any other issue in the case. If any of my statements or rulings 
am to indicate my opinion on any fact, this is not intended and you should 
sregard it. 
E. THE EVIDENCE in this case will consist of testimony by witnesses 
3er oath, exhibits admitted by the court, and stipulations of counsel. You 
e the exclusive judges of the facts, but you must determine the facts from 
e evidence produced here in court. You should act conscientiously and 
irly in weighing this evidence to reach a just verdict, regardless of what 
e consequences of such a verdict may be. 
GIVEN_ 
NOT GI 
SSUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF, REASONABLE DOUBT 
A. A DEFENDANT IS PRESUMED INNOCENT until each element of the offense 
irge is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If you have a reasonable doubt of 
i defendant's guilty your findings must be Mnot guilty". 
B. THE PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING the defendant guilty 
ond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence follows the defendant 
ough the trial until the prosecution has met this burden. 
C. A REASONABLE DOUBT is a doubt based on reason. It is substantial 
bt which remains after reviewing all the evidence. It may be created by 
evidence, or it may arise from the lack of evidence. Beyond a reasonable 
bt does not mean beyond all possible doubt/ or beyond any possibility of 
or. 
D. YOU HAVE A REASONABLE DOUBT, if you can honestly say you are not 
isfied of the defendant's guilt/ after reviewing all the evidence. 
E. YOU DO NOT HAVE A REASONABLE DOUBT if you can honestly say you are 
mly convinced of the defendant's guilt/ after reviewing all the evidence, 
that you have no real questions of his/her guilt. 
F. IF TWO INTERPRETATIONS can be made from the evidence ^ in this case, 
if one of these interpretations points to guilt and the other to 
oncence of the defendant/ it is your duty to adopt the interpretation 
nting to innocence. This rule applies only when both interpretations are 
sonable. 
GIVEN 
NOT GIVEN 
' DELIBERATIONS 
A. WHEN YOU GO TO THE JURY ROOM to discuss this case and arrive at a 
lict, the first thing you should do is choose a member of the jury to act 
foreperson. The foreperson will preside over your discussions and will 
1 the verdict to which you must all agree. Since this is a criminal case, 
verdict must be unanimous, must be in writing, and must be brought back 
D court. 
B. YOUR VERDICT must express the individual opinion of each juror, 
n you have made up your mind whether the defendant is guilty or innocent, 
't change it just because other jurors may disagree with you. Talk to your 
low jurors and consider their views. If you are persuaded your first 
elusion was wrong, don't hesitate to change it. Remember your duty as 
ors is to help each other in arriving at the truth. 
C. YOU WILL BE GIVEN forms of verdict to use in this case. Your 
reperson will sign the verdict which correctly sets forth your decision. 
ONLY THE FOREPERSON HAS TO SIGN THE VERDICT. When you have agreed on a 
edict, tell the bailiff you are ready to return to court. 
GIVEN. 
NOT GIVEN 
i 
FNESSES 
A. THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS means deciding whether the witness is 
:thy of belief. In analyzing credibility, it may be helpful to ask yourself 
>se questions: 
What impression is made by the witness1 appearance and manner of 
testifying? 
Has the witness made conflicting statements, or given testimony which 
is contrary to other evidence? 
Is the witness shown to be biased for or against one of the parties, or 
does the witness have a personal interest in how this case is decided? 
Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts in the first 
place, and the ability to remember them at this time? 
Is the witness* story reasonable in light of human experience? 
.ng these guidelines, you should determine the credibility, and what weight 
L should give to the testimony of each witness. 
B. CONFLICTS IN THE EVIDENCE may arise in several ways. It is common 
iwledge that two witnesses to the same event may tell different versions of 
One may have been a better observer or may have a better memory. For 
sonal reasons, a witness may slant his or her testimony, either consciously 
unconsciously. You should try to reconcile such conflicts and decide what 
i true facts are. 
C. IF YOU THINK A WITNESS HAS LIED about any material fact, you are 
e to disregard all the testimony from that witness, or give it what weight 
think it deserves. You don't have to believe any witness whose testimony 
not reasonable in view of all the facts. 
D. THE NUMBER OF WITNESSES on each side does not, in itself, indicate 
ch side has the stronger case. You may believe one witness against many, 
many witnesses against a few, depending on what you find their credibility 
be. 
E. THE DEFENDANT is a competent witness on his own behalf. If he 
oses to testify, his testimony should be given the same consideration as 
give to that of any other witness. The defendant has a constitutional 
ht not to testify. If he chooses not to do so, you should not consider 
s as having any bearing on his guilty or innocence. 
GIVEN 
NOT GIVEN 
Sh 
F THE ELEMENTS of the offense of Driving Under the Influence of 
1 are as follows, which elements must be proven beyond a reasonable 
That the defendant was driving, or in actual physical control, 
of a motor vehicle on November 2, 1991; at or near 5600 South 
Frontage Road, Roy City, Weber County, Utah, while under the 
influence of alcohol. 
GIVEN 
NOT GIVEN 
G. ONE IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL within the meaning of the law 
n it has so far affected his brain and nervous system to impair to an 
reciable degree his abilities of perception, coordination, or of will or 
gment, so that he is unable to operate his automobile with the degree of 
e which an ordinary person in the possession of his faculties would 
rcise under similar circumstances. 
GIVEN. 
NOT GIVEN 
Instruction No. 
You are instructed that the fact a person refuses to take a blood 
or breath test is no evidence of his guilt or innocence regarding the 
charge of DUI but is merely a fact that you may consider along with all 
other evidence with respect to the weight and credibility you give it. 
THE DEFENDANT IS CHARGED with the offense of Driving Under the 
iluence of Alcohol/Drugs, in violation of Ch. 41-6-44 of the Roy City 
iicipal Code, on November 2, 1991. 
GIVEN. 
NOT GIVEN 
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SECOND CIRCUIT COURT - ROY 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF ROY CITY 
VS 
MURPHY, MELVIN 
4189 SOUTH 300 WEST 
#62 
OGDEN UT 
CIRCUIT COURT 
ROY CITY DEPARTMENT 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
CASE NO: 
DOB: 
TAPE: 
DATE: 
912001982 
10/28/57 
3R775 COUNT: 
01/14/92 
0691 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDICATED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 1000.00 Susp: 300.00 
Jail: 90 DA Susp: 88 DA ACS: 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
60 HR 
0.00 Due: 
0.00 Due: 
0.00 Due: 
378.38 
321.62 
700.00 
TRACKING: 
Appeal 08/10/92 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Sentence: 
TAPE: 3R775 COUNT: 
Chrg: DUI 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 90 DAYS Suspended 
Community Service: 60 HOURS 
Fines and assessments entered: FN 
SB 
Total fines and assessments..: 
Conditions of Probation: 18 months informal Court Probation 
JAIL/FINE SUSP UPON PYMT OF FINE AND COMPLIANCE W/ALL ORDERS. 
1) ENROLL IN/COMPLETE ALC COUNSELING PROG THROUGH ROCKY MTN CON-
SULTANTS AND PAY ALL COSTS REQUIRED 2) PERFORM 60 HRS OF COM 
SER THROUGH ROCKY MTN CONSULTANTS 3) CONSUME NO ALC/DRG 4) VI-
OLATE NO LAW EXCEPT MINOR TRAFFIC IF LEGAL TO DRIVE 5) ATTEND 
MIN OF 1 A/A PER WEEK (NOTE: COURT IS NOT ASKING FOR MONTHLY 
PROOF, BUT WOULD LIKE IT MADE AVAILABLE WHEN REQUESTED) 6) DEF 
0691 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
1000.00 Suspended: 300.00 
88 DAYS 
378.38 
321.62 
700.00 
TO REPORT TO WCJ AT 6 PM ON 1/24/92 FOR 48 HRS. DEF TO PAY 
$100/MONTH COMMENCING 2/15/92. REVIEW OF FINE IS SET FOR 
8/20/92 AT 1:30 PM, BUT IF DEF CANNOT MAKE PYMTS HE NEEDS TO 
CONTACT CLERKS OFFICE ASAP TO MAKE OTHER ARRANGMENTS. 
DEF'S CONVICTION IS ENTERED. 
CALENDAR: 
REV FINE scheduled for 8/20/92 at 1:30 P in room 1 with RSD 
BY TH 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 days 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
